TRANSPARENCY, PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY LANDSCAPE SCAN

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

Each year, the Hewlett Foundation's transparency, accountability and participation (TPA) team of four program officers and three program associates commits roughly US $30 to $35 million in grants to organisations that advocate to governments to disclose more information, and that help communities address the problems they face, especially the quality of public services.

In 2020, the Hewlett Foundation asked OTT Consulting to develop an evaluation of the TPA grantmaking strategy (2015-2020) and a landscape scan of the TPA field, as part of its five-year strategy refresh process.

The landscape scan looks around at the current state of the field and how it is changing, and the evaluation looks back at what happened over the previous strategy cycle, and the to support the foundation's team to learn, adapt and respond to this new context in its 2020-2025 strategy. By publishing the results of this work, the Hewlett Foundation and OTT hope they will also serve as a resource for all organisations and individuals working in the TPA field.

This report contains selected content from five short reports that together formed the TPA landscape scan. Each section responds to a different set of questions posed by the Hewlett Foundation. There are four sections:

1. Global trends
2. Funding trends
3. Country snapshots: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania.
4. Country think pieces: Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Uganda

1. GLOBAL TRENDS

Articles have been adapted from an unpublished report on global trends in the transparency, participation and accountability (TPA) field, written as part of a scan of the TPA landscape undertaken by OTT Consulting to inform the Hewlett Foundation's new grantmaking strategy. Author: Linnea Mills. The scan is based on a review of relevant literature and interviews with a carefully selected number of thought leaders. More on scope, methodology and sources.

1.1 Proving TPA's relevance in an increasingly autocratic world

1.1.1 The urgent need for stronger evidence

A familiar challenge, a renewed imperative

In 2010, the UK Department for International Development (now the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office) decided it was high time we better understood the impact and effectiveness of initiatives in the TPA field and commissioned John Gaventa and Rosemary McGee to assess the evidence.

They found that the field relied on "untested normative assumptions and under-specified relationships between mechanisms and outcomes" and that "the available evidence of impact is uneven and sparse, considering the amount of attention and donor funding focused on this field" (Gaventa and McGee, 2013: 11, 16).

A decade on, not only do many knowledge gaps remain, but the imperative to show that the TPA field's assumptions are still relevant is now even more vital given global trends towards autocratisation and top-down policymaking.

In a world that's increasingly turning its back on democratic ideals and amid a political climate in which many governments strive to discredit democracy and civic participation, the TPA field cannot afford to stand on anything less than solid ground.

According to the experts and thought leaders we spoke to, the lack of evidence about the impact of TPA initiatives is now an existential threat to the field. As one thought leader we spoke to described it, the window of opportunity for social accountability will remain open only if we can surface evidence that social accountability works and is worthy of continued support.

Of course, many factors influence donor support to issues and countries, and TPA can be supported because of its intrinsic value of enhancing democracy, as well as its instrumental value of enhancing public services.

The risk of a TPA backlash, however, is not just real from the perspective of governments and funders but also from citizens themselves.

Some recent evidence has pointed to citizen withdrawal as a result of transparency and participation not being perceived to lead to accountability. One such study, found evidence that in countries with high levels of corruption, transparency is associated with a sense of resignation and withdrawal from public engagement among citizens (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014).

A systematic evidence review found that the effects of transparency are very much a product of the environment where it is put into practice (Cucciniello et al., 2017). It is particularly alarming, then, that research being conducted in the TPA field is greatly skewed. As one thought leader noted:

> *It is surprising if you look at literature reviews on tax in Africa, there are hardly any serious Southern academics and universities featuring.*

Research institutions in the Global South generally have fewer opportunities to access public funding as compared with their Northern counterparts. External donors and funders therefore have an important role to play in filling the resource gap. Understanding these critical conditions remains a frontier in TPA research, and there is value in seeking the perspective of those who best understand the operating context.

1.1.2 Finding the missing link between TPA and development impact

If there are question marks about the power of transparency and participation to create accountability, there is even more uncertainty about TPA having development impact. One thought leader told us:

> *There's a fatigue, both among actors in the TPA field and more broadly that quite a lot of resources have been spent on transparency and participation but that does not seem to be translating into actual lives being transformed and*

actual improvements in public service delivery. The question is, what is the missing link?

The missing link contender one: the implementation gap

For many TPA initiatives, the outcome of their work is the formal enactment of laws and regulations, these include disclosure laws in natural resource governance or transparency in government procurement, among others (Mills, 2019; NRGI, 2019).

Various TPA actors and initiatives (including Hewlett Foundation grantees) have started paying attention to what they call the 'implementation gap' – that is the failure to fully and properly apply, uphold and enforce enacted TPA laws.

The assumed link between accountability-related reforms and development progress breaks down in the absence of effective implementation.

For example, a budget holder's failure to execute a country (or sector) budget in accordance with the laws voted for by parliament or congress (de Renzio et al., 2019). How can a budget set aside for health services provision lead to better health if the money that exists on paper is never spent?

The missing link contender two: accountability ecosystems

Also gaining attention in discussions on the 'missing link' between TPA and development impact is the role of accountability ecosystems. This challenges the approach of many TPA actors that has tended to focus on strengthening accountability institutions in isolation from the wider, interrelated context in which they operate.

Recently published research on auditing systems showed that, in impact terms, little can be expected from strengthening supreme audit institutions if at the same time the institutions and processes that engage with the audit findings (including parliamentary accounts committees and civil society organisations) remain weak (IBP/IDI, 2020).

On the other side of the coin, some are cautiously optimistic that the enormous stimulus packages prompted by the global Covid-19 pandemic may help to make financial accountability a greater political priority, which may – if it receives enough attention – have a lasting positive effect on wider accountability systems.

1.1.3 New ways of working and organising in the TPA field

Citizen movements and protests at the centre of global issue

To remain and further demonstrate its relevance, the TPA field must find ways to be part of the solutions to the major global challenges of our times, such as climate change, democracy and equality. As one thought leader put it:

> *Funders are under pressure to connect TPA to the Southern unemployment crisis or racial inequality, democracy, etc. They try to find a bigger waterfront of issues and see how they relate, and this is filtering down to those groups that are specific transparency and accountability actors. How does their work reinforce broader movements? I see a number of donors struggling with that adaptation right now. This is what I see taking up a lot of the debates and strategy sessions of different organisations.*

Rather than the traditionally-organised TPA actors being at the centre of these global issues, mass protests and grassroots movements (in their various guises) are becoming the order of the day.

In 2019, citizens mobilised in the millions to demand political action to combat climate change, with teenager Greta Thunberg as their unlikely front figure, and 2020 will go down in history for the mass mobilisation of citizens against racial inequality.

Professionalisation versus grassroots: a paradox for legitimacy

These citizen movements are – or at least are perceived to be – closer to citizens and this is becoming the Achilles heel of the TPA field, in which NGOs and INGOs often appear professional but detached given they are often based in the Global North or in capital cities.

On the one hand, the professionalisation of civil society organisations has enabled them to engage in high-level and technical conversations in areas such as natural resource governance. On the other, there is a fear that this has removed them from the grassroots and in so doing stripped them of their legitimacy among decision-makers. As one thought leader from an INGO explained:

> *Policymakers ask 'Who are you speaking for? Who do you represent? Why should I be listening to you?'. The more removed you are from citizens and the voices on the*

> *ground the less legitimacy your voice has. In turn, the lack of legitimacy undermines your capacity and ability to exert pressure on governments. So, we find that we are producing a lot of knowledge but our ability to force the government to act is limited.*

It is not only policymakers who question who it is that these organisations speak for; their legitimacy is also questioned by the very citizens they are supposed to represent.

Meanwhile, as professionalised TPA organisations have struggled to defend their legitimacy, grassroots campaigners face the challenge of translating protest energy into policy impact.

Recent research by the Carnegie Institute for Peace puts forward two options to reconcile this divide. The first is for professionalised NGOs to try to 'hybridise', developing in-house capacity for both policy analysis and mass mobilisation. The other option is for these organisations to build formal or informal coalitions with groups that are working at the grassroots level.

Both of these strategies pose challenges: NGOs will need to develop new skills, attempt to bring together distinct organisational cultures and methodologies, and define and articulate policy demands that are not only technically sound but publicly appealing. In many instances, coalition-building will be an easier road given it does not require altering internal organisational and personnel structures (Bellows, 2020).

Strength in numbers

Increased coalition-building is already happening, as one thought leader noted:

> *Coalitions are definitely a trend that seems to be increasing whereby many organisations are no longer engaging as themselves but rather are seeking to find ways of pulling in other people. So, you don't see big organisations forming in this space but rather many small organisations coming together. This might be a survival tactic because there are only so many resources.*

Coalition-building is also, as suggested here, a risk mitigation strategy and as the civil space shrinks in many countries, we are likely to see more and more CSOs joining forces. For example, in one recent and interesting example from Ghana, more than 400 CSOs

joined forces to challenge the President's decision to force the head of the country's supreme audit institution to take a substantial period of leave from his position. The coalition argued that the President's directive to the Auditor-General, who is reputed as a staunch anti-corruption campaigner, goes against the spirit and letter of Ghana's 1992 Constitution (GhanaWeb, 2020). A smaller number of CSOs subsequently took the government to court.

1.1.4 The risks posed by new ways of working

New and different ways of organising the TPA field looks set to be a lasting trend – whether professionalised NGOs join forces with grassroots movements vertically or form horizontal CSO coalitions.

These changes will raise important questions related to risk, both for donors and for organisations and initiatives that accept external funding.

In recent years, some larger bilateral donors have started paying greater attention to risk management (Gulrajani and Mills, 2019). Risk management is not about eliminating risks but rather articulating them and putting in place measures to mitigate these and any unanticipated risks.

From the perspective of development cooperation, risk can be grouped into three overlapping categories (OECD, 2014):

1. **Contextual risk** refers to the range of potential adverse outcomes that may arise in a particular context, such as the risk to civic engagement related to the trend of autocratisation and subsequent closing of civil space. A donor has only a limited influence on contextual risk in the short term, but they seek to support interventions that create conditions for reduced contextual risk in the long term.

2. **Programmatic risk** relates to the risk that interventions do not achieve their objectives or cause inadvertent harm by, for example, exacerbating social tensions. Programmatic risks relate to weaknesses in programme design and implementation or a dysfunctional relationship between the donor/funder and their implementing partners/grantees.

3. **Institutional risk** refers to the range of potential consequences of various types of failure in the programmes/projects intervention can have for donor/funder or grantee. Reputational risk is an important part of institutional risk. Since donors use public money or donations and are consequently scrutinised by political processes and/or by the press, they very much trade on their reputation. That reputation can be seriously damaged very quickly, say by a corruption scandal involving a grantee.

In terms of the trend towards vertical collaboration between NGOs and grassroots organisations, the added risk to donors could be that, through grants to NGOs, it becomes (indirectly) implicated in party politics. This is particularly the case in countries where popular movements are linked to opposition parties or have other political or religious affiliations.

A similarly cautious approach may be warranted when it comes to building or joining CSO coalitions. Individual grantees can be vetted, but if these grantees are in or form coalitions with other CSOs, this can implicate the grantmaker in whatever these other actors are involved in.

There is also potential programmatic risk involved in supporting grassroots movements or professionalised NGOs who wish to create vertical links to movements, and this has to do with the potential harm external funding can cause. Governments in various autocratising contexts have tried to delegitimise organisations that accept foreign funding and prevent external funding from reaching the TPA space. In Ethiopia, for example, the government's narrative is that foreign funding is what is spurring an industry of activist citizens who are pushing for government accountability. To that end, the government enacted a law that said that if a CSO gets more than a certain percentage of its budget from external sources it has to register as a foreign agent, which also has the effect of disallowing them from undertaking certain activities. The governments of Tanzania and Kenya are moving along a similar path.

As one thought leader cautioned:

> *While support for movements is critical, it needs to be done in a way that enhances the movement, and we need to study what has worked in this regard. Where has external support to movements really made a positive contribution? Studying the Black Lives Matter movement in the US might be a good starting point. Importantly, efforts should be made to understand what funding does to movements before it's undertaken.*

Some useful groundwork has been laid in this regard with a recent report by Datta and Baertl (2020) on why and how collaboration between think tanks and social movements takes place, and how funders can best support such collaboration.

1.2 The evolutionary progression of TPA

In our interviews with thought leaders on TPA, we started to see a pattern. The TPA subfields evolve and progress through three stages. And in each evolutionary stage, there are specific opportunities and risks for donors.

Stage 1 Norm change	→	Stage 2 Rule change	→	Stage 3 Proper implementation

Stage 1: Changing norms

The first evolutionary stage is all about spreading an idea and changing global norms. This stage is, perhaps, the least complicated for a funder to support.

The diffusion of global norms starts with the emergence of a norm – such as corporates should invest and behave more responsibly. When enough countries adopt the norm, a tipping point is reached and many more countries will follow in response to international pressure.

This norm's diffusion is primarily undertaken by international organisations, professional associations and international advocacy coalitions, who lead the efforts to author, codify and validate these global norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Martinsson, 2011).

What does this mean for organisations in the TPA field, and for opportunities and risks? First, the ideal organisation for efforts at this first stage of TPA evolution is an international advocacy-oriented NGO with a global presence and headquartered in important political hubs.

For donors the main risk involved at this norm-changing stage is likely to be programmatic: political leaders may pay lip service to the new norm without actually having to change anything in practice; without tangible outcomes from an intervention, it may be hard to hold these leaders to their word or to demonstrate progress.

Stage 2: Changing rules

A new global norm cannot exist in an abstract form for too long. It needs to be anchored in laws, rules and behaviours. It is at this point that the newly shared and adopted norm is confronted by a country's institutional and political context – including possible vested interests seeking to maintain the status quo.

In challenging established ways of doing things, the organisation driving forward a TPA agenda in a subfield may therefore seek out partners, for example by tapping into grassroots movements or forming coalitions with other organisations.

In other words, anchoring or institutionalising a new norm is inherently a political undertaking in a country. As such, this rule changing stage presents many more risks for an external donor or funder, and any support that they provide to a subfield at this stage must be done with open eyes.

Stage 3: Making it work in practice

Some TPA subfields are sufficiently well-established to have successfully anchored their norms in national policies or laws. What then?

The third stage in a subfield's evolution is all about implementation: making sure that the policies and laws are upheld as intended, and can be considered the litmus test for whether $T + P = A$.

This stage is less about big national politics and more about accountability relationships, which can be much more localised and micro. Although this eases some of the risk for donors and funders, it also comes with fewer opportunities to demonstrate success, which an announcement of a policy reform can bring.

Legitimacy of voice here is important; it is not only what's being said that counts but who says it. And, whereas strategic coalitions were key in the previous stage, in this stage it is all about mass participation.

The question is: where does this leave donors? What types of organisations are best situated to support TPA subfields at this stage in their evolution, and what entry points and opportunities are there for donors and funders?

Hints can be found by looking at TPA subfields that have (at least in some countries) made it to this third stage.

1.2.1 Changing norms: responsible investment and corporate behaviour case

At this stage of its evolution, the responsible investment and corporate behaviour subfield mostly concerns spreading the idea that taxation should be more transparent. Tax transparency is expected to reduce corporate tax avoidance, especially by multinational corporations. And with corporate tax making up a significantly larger

share of government revenues in developing countries (about 16%) compared to OECD countries (about 8%), this particular norm shift has the potential to be highly pro-development.

A major actor in this TPA subfield is The B-Team, a collective of businesses and civil society leaders that came together after the 2008 global financial crisis to combat what they saw as being wrong with the corporate culture, including short-termism and shareholder primacy.

The TPA field's focus on more responsible corporate taxation came about in response to realisations that business-as-usual approaches were not fostering trust between corporates and society. A main contributing factor to this distrust was a growing perception of widespread corporate tax avoidance and a recognition that the way in which the international tax system has been built has allowed businesses (particularly multinationals) to play the system, exploit loopholes and, as a result, minimise their tax liabilities.

This has spurred the development of a set of Responsible Tax Principles, developed by The B-Team, together with civil society organisations, investors, international institutions and nine multinational corporations. And, three years on from the publication of these Principles, we are seeing norms start to change. Especially encouraging is the fact that many large investors are beginning to see multinational corporations' tax affairs as a source of risk and in turn are demanding more responsible corporate behaviour. As one thought leader explained:

> *We see more and more investors, both large and mainstream, starting to realise that tax is a key risk that needs to be built into their investment strategies. It is a reputational risk if companies are exposed as tax avoiders. It is also a financial risk because if companies have tax positions that might be subject to challenge from revenue authorities then these companies can end up with a big tax bill. We are also starting to see investors argue that tax is linked to contextual risk because it is tax, ultimately, that pays for the type of modern and functioning societies that we all aspire to and that, indeed, businesses rely upon. They need infrastructure to function and well-educated workforces, and a healthcare system that supports their staff. As a consequence, investors have started raising their expectations of companies.*

The Principles are now followed by 20 multinationals and efforts are underway to grow this number and to improve the Principles' implementation. Moreover, The B-Team – which initially had to actively convince companies to sign onto them – are now being approached by companies themselves, who see it in their own interest to sign onto the Principles.

Beyond norm setting and changing, the ambition in this subfield is to create some sort of informal advocacy coalition, formed of these multinational corporations, that would speak up for rule change – that is, to lobby governments to legally mandate that all companies to adopt some of the responsible behaviours that these corporates have voluntarily.

> *In time, we'll be able to do advocacy with this group of companies and I think that will be powerful. A big reason why rule change/legislation with regard to taxation, particularly regarding tax transparency, is tricky is because businesses lobby against it. We now have a group of companies doing it voluntarily and the best part about that is that all the arguments that have been used by businesses against transparency – the like of arguments that say that transparency undermines competitive positions and are incredibly costly from an administrative perspective – are sort of disintegrating because we have shown that it can be done.*

1.2.2 Changing rules: Natural resource governance

Transparency and citizen participation are seen as key to ensuring that wealth generated from the extractive sectors contributes to growth and poverty reduction.

For initiatives working in this TPA subfield, the theory of change is that civil society and citizens will make use of information about contracts, and government revenues and payments related to the extractive sector to hold the government accountable for their public spending decisions and for upholding integrity.

Equally, citizens will, if armed with information, use this to hold extractive companies accountable for their actions – including their contribution or lack thereof to communities affected by their presence (World Bank, 2016).

Since the early 2000s, TPA initiatives and actors, including Publish What You Pay, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Natural Resource

Governance Institute (formerly the Revenue Watch Institute), have managed to change the norms with respect to transparency in the extractive sector.

More than 50 countries now produce publicly accessible detailed reports on the revenues flowing to the government from oil, gas and mining industries (Gaventa, 2019). This is no mean feat, especially since conversations around extractive industry governance in many countries have been taboo and highly sensitive.

TPA efforts in the area of natural resource governance began with a singular focus on transparency of revenues – what governments receive and what companies pay – with CSOs using the narrative of the 'resource curse': why are people in resource-rich countries so poor?

Today, this subfield covers the entire extractives decision chain, starting from the decisions to exploit, contracts, legislation, revenue collection management systems and sustainable development. More recently, the EITI has also started looking at things beyond the direct focus of extractive governance, including issues of gender equality and energy transition.

Having achieved good results in changing norms relating to TPA in the extractive sector, in many countries this subfield has advanced to initiating policy, institutional and legal reforms.

This second rule-changing stage has, however, been tricky. Not only does the extractives sector have a powerful business lobby that would make it difficult to push through any changes that might be deemed disadvantageous to extractives corporations, but the government itself may also have strong reasons to resist reform.

In fact, control over the resource sector is considered one of the most politically valuable assets available, especially in poorer nations (Smith and Rosenblum, 2011). As one thought leader explained:

> *One constraint in this field that needs to be considered is that governance of the extractive sector cannot be divorced from the general state of democracy. In some African countries, leaders have been in office for decades as a direct result of being able to use the extractive sector for political purposes. Thus, any change to this sector is likely to be difficult politically, particularly in Africa since the very survival of many African regimes boils down to their direct involvement in the extractive industries.*

This political sensitivity has resulted in a certain level of 'window-dressing', with transparency laws being drafted and enacted but not ratified, applied or enforced (resulting in so-called implementation gaps, as discussed in section 2 of this report). Some governments have signed onto the EITI just to gain popularity among citizens and donors (Sovacool and Andrews, 2015). In such contexts, real progress towards TPA is naturally slow.

In this sort of political economy environment, power might be tilted towards good governance if civil society organisations are able to form large coalitions and mobilise a critical mass of people and institutions in support of the cause.

As for donors, the political nature of efforts at this second stage should make risk-averse donors tread carefully. Those looking to provide support to subfields at this stage in their evolution should put significant effort into understanding the political economy of these subfields in the countries they support.

Recent research published by the International Budget Partnership on the politics of tax reform (Lakin, 2020) is a good step in the right direction that could be undertaken for other TPA subfields as well, including natural resource governance.

1.2.3 Making it work in practice: procurement reform

Procurement accounts for around 50% of total government expenditure in low- and middle-income countries, making it one of the greatest corruption risks. Indeed, more than half (57%) of the 427 bribery cases concluded under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention involved bribes paid to secure public contracts (Amin, 2017).

To remedy this problem, ensure fairness and value for money, countries have undertaken various reforms to increase transparency and openness in public procurement.

Open contracting builds on the assumption that when governments make public procurement information accessible, businesses can compete fairly to win contracts and civil society can monitor the process to identify and challenge irregularities such as corruption and state capture (Amin, 2017).

The Open Contracting Partnership has played a norm-setting role in this TPA subfield, aided by the Open Contracting Data Standard, which many countries have endorsed through the Open Government Partnership (as commitments in their national action plans). Several countries also endorsed the Standard publicly during the international Anti-Corruption Summit that was held in London in 2016.

Some procurement transparency initiatives have gained international attention, driving progress in this subfield. For example, Ukrainian initiative ProZorro, which was developed in close cooperation between government, private sector and civil society, gained international recognition when it won the World Procurement Award in 2016 (Bugay, 2016).

More recently, in 2020, a procurement transparency initiative was the winning anti-corruption project in a competition organised by the International Monetary Fund. The project – 'Public Procurement Corruption Risks: Harnessing Big Data for Better Fiscal Growth' – created an intelligence tool that uses big data to spot corruption risks in public procurement processes.

In some countries, there are now good legal frameworks for procurement transparency in place and governments are sharing procurement data. However, as in the budget transparency subfield, work to ensure accountability in procurement has only just begun. Using the example of Nigeria, one thought leader explained:

> *Due to efforts by civil society, there is now a good legal framework in Nigeria for procurement transparency. This law is well established and used across the levels of government. However, the problem is that we don't know whether this has had any impact on actually making public procurement any more effective and less prone to corruption. What is needed now is procurement monitoring, specifically to focus on how public contracts are being implemented. These contracts may look good on paper and they can have followed the right procedure but if they are implemented in a way that is not in line with what the contract states, they will likely not have the intended results and be value for money.*

Like with budget transparency and monitoring, professionalised CSOs in this space lack capacity and legitimacy to take on this task of monitoring. Instead, it needs to happen at a much more localised level.

Specialised civil society organisations working in this subfield will therefore play more of a facilitator role, which can include training community monitors, providing technology-based services (e.g., digitalising monitoring information) and translating contract-related information into local languages.

1.2.4 An uncertain evolution: social accountability

You think that social accountability is the government responding to pressure from civil society but what has changed in the past few years is the emergence of a cohort of governments that no longer wait for civil society's pressure to appreciate social accountability but that proactively use it as part of their accountability system. This is an important trend to watch. (Thought leader)

Social accountability (with particular attention to health) is a form of participatory citizen engagement. It recognises that citizens are the people who are ultimately affected by healthcare decisions and are therefore the people who should affect change in health policies, health services and health provider behaviour through collective influence and action (Danhoundo et al., 2018).

Activities to advance social accountability in health can be undertaken across the budget cycle – starting with participatory budgeting, followed by health service monitoring (to ensure policy and budget are implemented as intended) and lastly engaging citizens in the auditing process through social audits and by sharing information with the supreme audit institution.

Social accountability gained traction during the third wave of democracy in the early 1990s, at a time when there was an abundance of new civic energy that pushed for democracy and democratic rights. This was also a time when many countries were drafting programmes of decentralisation for which engagement of citizens was a natural fit. In the early 2000s, the World Bank incorporated citizen participation into its accountability agenda, with the aim of facilitating citizen-led accountability of public institutions in addition to basic citizen engagement.

The question is, where did this TPA subfield go after this first stage of changing norms?

Despite its relatively long history as a theme, it might be fair to say that it has never been institutionalised like other TPA subfields (stage 2: rule change). On the other hand, single components of this subfield – including participatory budgeting and social audit – *have* clearly been institutionalised in various places around the world (Mills, 2016). An interesting trend is emerging where the government itself is a driver of social accountability.

The thought leader quoted at the top of this article went on to describe how Ghana's government is one of the countries in the forefront of this trend. Specifically, it has established a Directorate for Social Accountability within the Ministry of Local Government with the mandate to connect central government to local government and civil society. The fact that the government is investing in this role shows the value it assigns to ensuring that social accountability practice is a feature of its accountability ecosystem.

The Government of Ghana (and its line ministries), value social accountability for its ability to bridge the gaps that exist in government capacity to effectively monitor local-level service delivery and policy implementation. During an interview in September 2019, a representative of the health sector in Ghana described this as follows:

> *There are so many small health service providers that we do not have the capacity to monitor and supervise what is going on. That is why [social accountability projects] are so important. They provide us with a lot of information from the community level that, in turn, can inform us in our policy deliberation. It also serves to hold the government to account, looking at how the money that the government is spending on providing health services is being put to use in practice... In addition, civil society organisations (CSOs) have the ability to get honest answers from people, which is something that we in government may not always be able to get.*
>
> *(Mills, 2019)*

Interestingly, governments that are not known for giving CSOs much room for manoeuvre in regard to other facets of TPA are among those governments that have begun to institutionalise social accountability activities.

The Government of Rwanda, for example, puts a rigid structure around civil society relationships; yet it has also developed a framework for CSO monitoring of public contracts in the agricultural sector to make government resources in agriculture more transparent and accountable. Similarly, in Uganda, amidst its general lack of liberalism, there are pockets of government that have a great commitment to social accountability and this is particularly manifested in citizen monitoring of government contracts.

2. FUNDING TRENDS

Articles have been adapted from an unpublished report on funding trends in the transparency, participation and accountability (TPA) field, written as part of a TPA landscape scan undertaken by OTT Consulting to inform the Hewlett Foundation's new grantmaking strategy. The report is authored by Jenny Lah. The analysis draws on data, funders' documents, other news reports and a series of semi-structured discussions with 16 funders and network staff. It relies on data sources that demonstrate scale and trends – namely the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD's DAC. More on scope, methodology and data.

2.1. Global and regional funding shifts

2.1.1. COVID-19 and TPA funding

Since COVID-19, funding to TPA-related issues has likely decreased

Interviewees didn't see much change in 2019 on 2018 trends, which seems re-affirmed by preliminary DAC data (OECD DAC, 2020). In 2020, overseas development aid (ODA) increased by $10 billion due to support for Covid-19 (OECD DAC, 2021), though there were significant cuts by the UK.

Though overall disbursements were up, many bilaterals faced challenges with their programs and re-directed resources to respond to the health situation and related crises in livelihoods, education, and other areas (DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, 2020). They have also delayed work that's difficult to implement in pandemic conditions. Other changes resulting from COVID-19 included additional reliance on local partners and increasing emphasis on digital approaches (OECD, 2020).

Some countries and blocks (like Canada, Germany and France) have maintained or increased ODA. There are concerns that ODA has not increased enough to address the crisis however. There are also concerns that future cuts are likely, including countries with a lower gross national income (GNI) reducing their ODA to match their commitment to a percentage of GNI.

Some donor governments may decrease public spending later as they seek to curb their growing public debt. Eurodad's analysis looking at the post-2008 global financial crisis period suggests that even if there aren't cuts now, bilateral donors may make cuts a few years from now (Van de Poel, 2020). This may lead to more bilateral governments

changing their strategies (as the UK is doing) but thus far, no other country has yet followed in reducing its ODA-to- GNI commitment.

For philanthropies, Covid-19 has led to a focus on health and direct response to crises

A study on US philanthropies' responses to Covid-19 shows that a majority were planning to spend more, and the focus areas for increased spending were health services, social justice, economic recovery and other responses (Dalberg, 2020). TPA-specific issues did not figure highly.

Dalberg also found a similar trend among African philanthropies in their responses to Covid-19, who have also increased funding to health, food security and economic issues (Mwangi, Tsan, & Tweed, 2020).

In theory, more funding to health could lead to more funding to some TPA issues like social accountability for health. Many field actors have presented and written on social accountability during the pandemic (Open Government Partnership, 2020), but it is not clear if and how funders are involved. It does not appear to be a part of vaccine finance yet, with calls for open vaccine contract going unheeded.

Multilateral financial institutions have increased their funding during the crisis

Multilaterals increased their commitments much more than bilaterals during the crisis. Initial analysis found that bilateral commitments declined by 17% in 2020 compared to 2019, while multilateral finance institution (MFI) commitments increased by 31% (Dodd, Breed, & Coppard, 2020).

For many MFIs, these extraordinary efforts were achieved through frontloading future budgets. This means that they will need replenishments to continue their spending in the future. As MFIs are funded by shareholder countries, this could lead to lower spending later if replenishments are insufficient to maintain current levels.

The World Bank is under pressure to increase its disbursements to meet its over $100 billion commitment to respond to Covid-19 as it has been behind (Duggan et al., 2020).

One way to do this quickly is to make loans to governments in ways that do not require significant project preparation like budget support. The World Bank has increasingly taken on aspects of the TPA agenda, but this is subject to negotiation with country clients and ongoing donor pressure. Many analysts and advocates are watching these loans for adequate transparency and accountability.

The International Monetary Fund has provided some of the quickest response packages in reaction to the Covid-19 crisis. However, many advocates are concerned about austerity conditionalities in emergency packages, which could impede democratic control over budget spending in the medium to long term (Jones, 2020). Advocates also note that a third of countries "failed to commit to undertake audits for their Covid-19 expenditures" (Daar & Tamale, 2020).

2.1.2.   Global and regional funding shifts

Global governance funding increased slightly

International funding for governance as reported to the DAC increased slightly from $19.5 billion in 2015 to $22 billion in 2018.

The subset of that governance funding from DAC-member bilaterals (the largest bilateral donors apart from China) also increased from $11 billion in 2015 to $13 billion in 2018 – 10% of overall ODA disbursements (DAC Network on Governance, 2021).

Governance funding to sub-Saharan Africa is robust based on DAC data

Overall, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South and Central Asia receive the most funding compared to other regions. In terms of trends, governance funding was up in SSA, the Middle East, Europe and South America since 2015. Governance funding was down significantly to the Caribbean and Central America and Far East Asia by 2018.

In 2019, the top-five country recipients of international funding for governance in SSA were:

- Kenya ($400.6 million from all sources),
- Nigeria ($308.1 million),
- Ethiopia ($271.9 million),
- Niger ($231.0 million) and
- Uganda ($196.0 million).

Some funders, including Germany and the EU, have shifted their focus to Africa (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany, 2017) (European Commission, 2020).

The Sahel region in particular has also received increased attention in light of conflicts, humanitarian crisis and increased migration of refugees (Alliance Sahel, 2020) (European Commission, 2020).

Analysts have long expected (or even encouraged) donors to reduce concessional finance to stable middle-income countries like Ghana and Senegal. Analysts and funders have discussed moving to other kinds of partnership models, such as peer learning (Provost, 2014) (Steensen, 2014). However, for Ghana and Senegal specifically, ODA did not fall from 2015 to 2019.

Interviewees noted that Ghana and Senegal, as well as Kenya, remain regional hubs, meaning that funders locate their offices there and develop regional programs from these countries. This creates network effect, and entities in these countries receive more funds compared to other countries.

Most African philanthropists are not interested in TPA

Most African philanthropists are not interested in funding TPA issues according to a recent study by Bridgespan (Schwier, Wallington, Holland, & Magoronga, 2020). They want to avoid politically risky issues and thus frame their giving as addressing 'basic needs', such as poverty reduction, hunger, health and education. This matches the findings of an earlier study on funding to think tanks in developing countries (Lah, 2017), which also found that philanthropists in developing countries tend to focus on traditional charitable giving topics or topics relevant to their businesses, e.g., entrepreneurship.

2.1.3. Types of organisations being funded

Developing-country governments are the most common recipients of international funding

'Recipient governments' receive the most funding out of all the organisation types, because bilaterals and multilaterals tend to work with them. Support through recipient governments was down slightly in 2018.

The four other common types of organisations receiving funds are donor governmental bodies, donor-country NGOs, UN institutions and other multilaterals. In 2018, DAC bilaterals increased funding through their own governments and the private sector compared to 2015.

NGOs received more funding

NGOs saw an increase in funding, including a slight increase in funding to developing country-based NGOs. However, donor-based NGOs still receiving the bulk of funds to NGOs, and funding to developing country-based NGOs increased from a lower base. Funding for listed INGOs (which are categorised separately but often headquartered in the Global North with many regional and country offices) was also up slightly.

Interviewees suggested that philanthropies and some bilaterals are discussing funding local civil society organisations directly more frequently. However, it is not yet clear how much budgets and investments have actually changed.

Several interviewees reported shifting their funding away from organisations based in the Global North and towards regional or country-based organisations. USAID has moved in this direction, launching a New Partnership Initiative to allow 'USAID to work with a more diverse range of partners, including local organisations in partner countries' (Maloney, 2020). USAID has been attempting more local contracting since the Obama administration, so it is likely that some efforts will continue in this direction under the Biden administration. But funding or attempting to fund local organisations is not a uniform trend among bilaterals and philanthropies. Based on strategy documents, some bilateral funders are not focused on this.

Other interviewees noted that there was more emphasis on improving funding through coalitions, partnerships, networks and INGOs. They mentioned co-ownership and better ways to support subgrantees through Global North-South partnership. Some staff of philanthropies discussed this option because they do not have country-level presence to facilitate direct grant-making.

Large-scale African philanthropy is not yet a major source of funding for local NGOs

Large-scale philanthropists based in Africa tend to 'give mainly within their own countries' according to a recent Bridgespan study, but not generally to NGOs (Schwier, Wallington, Holland, & Magoronga, 2020).

This giving goes predominantly to the public sector (such as public hospitals and government programmes) and to their own operating foundation, with only 9% going to local organisations.

2.2. Funding strategies

2.2.1.   Changes in funder strategies

World-changing events: funders watching closely but directions uncertain

Given the dramatic events in 2020, it's been difficult to get a comprehensive picture of all the changes donors are undertaking. There are many other changes happening beyond Covid-19 – such as elections, the Black Lives Matter movement going global, impending debt crises and more – so it is hard to say what will happen. Many staff of funders are still processing all these changes, including through developing narratives of what is happening.

Some interviewees felt that Covid-19 may lead to an increased focus on governance as citizens see the importance of it in crisis responses. Increasing business sector interest in social issues could influence governments. In addition, young people in many countries have different kinds of expectations about government and new ways of working and using technology.

Some saw that more governments are restricting civic space and democratic practices due to Covid-19 (International IDEA, 2020), which could lead to future reactions. Transparency alone hasn't been sufficient because governments 'know how to use it in their favour', so funders may renew attention to key rights, as well as addressing misinformation.

Still others expected that Covid-19 would not lead to much change in the TPA field. Previous trends toward increasing authoritarianism may just continue with funders focused on other topics.

Bilaterals: Renewed commitments to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but UK cuts to ODA a big issue for the field

Some bilaterals (including the EU, Denmark, Germany and Sweden) are maintaining their focus on democracy, human rights and the rule of law due to concerns about democratic rollback and anti-democratic trends worldwide.

For example, the EU adopted its 2020–24 action plan on human rights and democracy and will be developing 'human rights and democracy country strategies' in 2021 (European Union, 2020). Sweden has convened a 'Friends in Defence of Democracy' group (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 2020).

USAID also continues to be a major democracy funder. US President Biden announced his administration would convene a summit of democracies (Biden, 2019), which indicates a stronger focus on democracy. USAID's current major framework, the Journey to Self-Reliance, includes many TPA elements, including open and accountable governance (USAID, ND).

At the same time, the overall field has learned that prescriptive approaches to democracy and governance are rarely appropriate. One interviewee said that the field had moved to be problem-led, context-driven, and more iterative. Issues of inclusion, effectiveness and accountability continue to be discussed among bilaterals (Menocal & OECD, 2020).

Not all bilaterals are maintaining their funding. The UK government announced major cuts to the UK's commitments to ODA, initially a cut of £2.9 billion in 2020. In the second half of 2020, it announced an additional cut that would reduce the UK's

commitment to ODA from 0.7% of GNI to 0.5% (Dickson, 2020). The overall reduction is expected to be about £4.5 billion compared to 2019 (Development Initiatives, 2021). This follows the UK government's recent merger of its Department for International Development into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to form the FCDO.

Several interviewees commented that these cuts were of major concern for TPA organisations as the UK is an anchor funder in many TPA-relevant initiatives, including key trust funds at the World Bank. At the time of writing (February 2021) some organizations had received notice of cuts or are waiting for further news.

Philanthropies: Few new entrants and current philanthropies are evolving

The Chandler Foundation was the most-mentioned new funder of TPA. It is the newest member of TAI that is focused on anti-corruption. Otherwise, there have been almost no other new philanthropic funders entering the TPA space globally. The Skoll Foundation, BHP Billiton Foundation and Laudes Foundation were the other philanthropies mentioned as potentially relevant to TPA spaces.

Other large philanthropies like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Packard Foundation remain focused on other approaches and sectors, e.g. global health and innovation.

Major philanthropies focused on TPA have a variety of goals and lenses on this work. Some are focused on inequality, while others are looking more at digital rights, while still others are undergoing strategy rethinks.

One interviewee noted that TPA can feel 'narrow and niche' and because it has not been consistent in making connections to other constituencies and sectors. 'Our vocabulary limits us,' and it continues to be difficult to communicate about an area that is viewed as less tangible, especially to leaders of other funding organisations.

Multilaterals: TPA is recognised but implementation is less clear

Interviewees suggested that the World Bank has evolved to increasingly embed some aspects of TPA in its global strategies and select lending operations (World Bank, 2020). It promotes budget transparency and open contracting. It is also calling for debt transparency.

However, the embeddedness of TPA may be stronger in the World Bank's governance global strategy than its country operations. MFIs' like the World Bank work closely with country governments when they make loans to governments. The interest of countries to engage on TPA issues strongly shape the World Bank's operations. Country work is also shaped by the World Bank's own country offices, which vary in their own interest in these

issues. One interviewee emphasised that donor pressure on the World Bank and funding for TPA are needed to maintain TPA on the agenda.

It is less clear to what extent the African Development Bank (AfDB) is using or promoting TPA approaches based on online materials. The African Development Fund's (ADF's) plan for its previous replenishment included transparency in PFM; social accountability and citizen participation in monitoring and decisions; DRM and natural resource governance (African Development Fund, 2016).

However, the ADF has not published public documentation for the most recent replenishment other than meeting notices and a press release (African Development Bank, 2019). The African Development Institute has hosted an event on transparency in PFM since the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic, suggesting that this issue remains salient (African Development Institute, 2020).

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been criticized on TPA issues, especially safeguards (Horta & Wang, 2020). At the same time, some countries prefer to work with it because it is able to lend more quickly than older MDBs.

During Covid-19, the IMF has yet again become one of the most important funders to developing countries. The IMF has made progress increased its own transparency of documentation and has promoted some TPA themes and related issues like equity. Many advocates find its actions still insufficient, including in in the implications of conditionalities on loans.

2.2.2. Gender equality and social inclusion in funder strategies

Philanthropies take bespoke approaches to gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) based on their organisational goals, values and cultures

Philanthropies working on TPA take diverse and bespoke approaches to GESI and less commonly refer to human rights instruments compared to public funders. GESI approaches vary in terms of goals, values and philosophies, leadership commitments, management and resources these efforts, approaches and activities and application of GESI principles to internal issues.

A simplified way to understand this diversity is to group philanthropies by their level of formal commitment to, resourcing of and approaches to GESI.

At one end of the spectrum, some funders said they take note of specific inequalities only when they are relevant to their overall goal. This means GESI itself is neither a primary nor secondary commitment. Their approaches to GESI are informal, personalised and

minimally-resourced. Rather than produce their own top-down requirements, these funders discuss GESI issues with grantees and are generally supportive of grantees' actions.

Towards the middle of the spectrum are funders that are moving away from informality and are exploring or starting to define GESI approaches. Many are selecting a few commitments to start. Some are looking at relationships between intermediaries and subgrantees through the GESI lens. Others may look at issues regarding safeguards (Hodal, 2019).

On the other end of the spectrum, some funders have formal GESI portfolios with resources and an application of GESI across their organisations. The Ford Foundation is an example of this with grantmaking portfolios in gender, racial and ethnic justice and disability inclusion. It also has a diversity, equity and inclusion toolkit (Ford Foundation, ND) and a disability inclusion toolkit (Rublee & LaVant, 2020).

Racial justice internationally is a new issue for most US philanthropies

Philanthropies are reacting to the Black Lives Matter movement, and many have made announcements about increased funding for Black activism and racial justice movements in the US (Schultz, 2020) (Candid, 2020).

Candid has tracked billions in giving since 2011 to racial justice in the US, including over $1 billion from MacKenzie Scott and donor-advised funds at JPMorgan Chase, as well as $885 million from the Ford Foundation. The Hewlett Foundation has made a commitment to address systemic racism in the US, and it has joined the Democracy Frontlines Fund, which "supports a slate of 10 frontline organisations curated by a brain trust of women of colour with deep experience funding social movements" (Libra Foundation, 2020). The organisations receive unrestricted multiyear support.

The public discussion on racial justice and 'decolonising development' is dynamic. Advocates have suggested a variety of responses, including focusing on leadership and staff diversity, holding dialogues explicitly about race and systemic inequalities, amplifying diverse voices, funding local organisations, funding Black-led organisations, participatory grantmaking, challenging colonial thinking and re-examining priorities (Batten, Jones, MacKrell, & Petit-Frere, 2020) (Lawrence & Fine, 2021)(Weisenfeld, 2020) (Baguios, 2020) (Cheney, 2020).

Compared to articles and announcements on US-based work, there were few pieces speaking about philanthropies' racial justice approaches to international work though.

In one of the few written pieces on racial justice and philanthropy internationally, Nicolette Naylor, International Program Director at Ford, and Aleyamma Matthew of the Collective Future Fund discuss addressing anti-Black violence against women and girls, building transnational solidarity connecting Black women leaders and going 'beyond rapid-response funds: commit to Black-, Indigenous-, and women-of-colour-led organisations for the long haul' (Mathew & Naylor, 2020). Since this article was published, the Ford Foundation supported the launch of the Black Feminist Fund working internationally (Ford Foundation, 2021).

Other mentions of racial justice work globally included the W.K Kellogg Foundation's Racial Equity 2030 open call to advance racial equity globally with $90 million (Kellogg Foundation, 2020). OSF's Human Rights Initiative addresses albinism in Africa and issues related to statelessness (Open Society Foundations, 2020). Echoing Green launched a Racial Equity Philanthropic Fund that plans to support social enterprise and leaders globally (Brown, 2020). There were even fewer mentions of bilateral or multilateral donors updating their strategies to account for racial justice issues.

Newer funder approaches to GESI: consultation, participation, and flexibility

For philanthropies, there is no roadmap for GESI. Interviewees advised that others starting to work on GESI and/or diversity, equality and inclusion should start from their values and then look at the specific problems in their fields and their own roles. Further advice from interviewees was to getting clear on frameworks, including naming specific philosophies or approaches, and making GESI everyone's job rather than a silo.

Two examples were mentioned. The Equality Fund and Other Foundation demonstrate newer approaches to GESI in philanthropy.

The Equality Fund, a combined philanthropy and impact investor, underwent a consultation process with feminist movements, in line with Canada's feminist foreign policy. It developed nine principles as a result, including a commitment to 'undo patriarchal relationships' and raise the power of 'women, girls, and trans and non-binary people.' The Fund supports the 'nothing about us, without us' principle and seeks to both improve on the immediate needs of individuals and structural issues like 'policy, law, and institutions.'

Based on the principles, the Fund supports more flexible and multiyear arrangements, simpler grant processes, a relationship-building mindset, participation in collaborations, ongoing consultation and support to safety and wellbeing (Equality Fund; Canadian Women's Foundation; Community Foundations of Canada, 2020).

The Other Foundation, which supports LGBTQI+ people in Southern Africa, has pioneered a participatory grantmaking approach. The Foundation's board asked the public to 'nominate a panel of peer reviewers to help review and assess grant applications.' Applications were received through an open call, and peer reviewers played a key role in selection (Other Foundation, 2014).

3. COUNTRY SNAPSHOTS

Country snapshots have been adapted from an unpublished report on country-level trends in the transparency, participation and accountability (TPA) field, written as part of a TPA landscape scan undertaken by OTT Consulting to inform the Hewlett Foundation's new grantmaking strategy. Authors: Ajoy Datta and Fletcher Tembo. More on scope, methodology and sources.

In this section, we take a closer look at the governance indicators, political context, civil society and citizen engagement in five countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania. We've sought to capture salient political economy factors, both barriers and enablers, that are representative of the range of contexts in which the Hewlett foundation is working.

3.1. Burkina Faso

3.1.1.   Economic, social and governance indicators

- **71% of the Burkina Faso's population is concentrated in rural areas**, with the population increasing fourfold since its independence to just over 20 million in 2019 (Feng, 2015).

- **The country has experienced low but steady per capita income growth** since gaining independence in 1960, limited only by periodic droughts experienced by Sahelian countries.

- **Burkina Faso hasn't undergone structural transformation** to an industrially oriented economy despite efforts (especially in the 1970s), nor have benefits of economic growth been inclusive, with high levels of inequality (Koussoube et al., 2014).

- **Poverty rates have remained largely unchanged** (UNU WIDER, 2014), with the absolute number of poor people increasing by more than 2 million between 1994/95 and 2009 (Koussobe et al., 2014).

- **It is classified as a least developed country**; in 2017 Burkina Faso ranked 183rd out of 189 countries and territories scoring 0.423 on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018).

- **Citizens have complained about problems with basic infrastructure** such as water, education (particularly secondary and tertiary education) and

healthcare (BTI, 2018). Only 20% of the population have access to sanitation.

- **Citizens felt state performance was broadly improving** in health, education and police services (Afrobarometer). Citizens may regard recent gains as especially noteworthy precisely because of the country's low base of state performance (Bratton et al., 2019).

- **Governance indicators have remained stable in recent years:**
  - <u>On transparency and accountability</u>: scores 45.7 out of 100 on the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, with no change over the past five years.
  - <u>On voice and accountability</u>: the country scores 39.9 out of 100 on the 2019 Worldwide Governance Indicators – a reduction of 3 points over the past five years.
  - <u>Global Corruption Barometer 2019</u>: 62% of citizens agreed that "Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption" in Burkina Faso – an increase of 1 % point in the past five years.

3.1.2. Political context

Historical and political factors

- **A former French colony, Burkina Faso gained independence in 1960**, initially operated as a one-party state, with transitions in power made forcibly through military coups.

- **In 1987, Blaise Compaore ousted Thomas Sankara and went on to rule for 27 years** as part of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP). The need to distribute rents to key members of the ruling coalition was often to the detriment of investments in economic and social sectors.

- **By the early 2010s the ruling coalition was showing signs of weakness**. Soldiers in the military were agitating against increased inequalities, and citizens were making more demands for democracy and accountability tied to increasing literacy and urbanisation (Koussobe et al., 2014).

- **In 2014, Compaore was ousted in a popular uprising**. Presidential and legislative elections brought to power Roch Marc Kabore of the People's Movement for Progress (MPP) (formed out of the CDP), the country's first formally elected civilian leader.

- **Formal political competition continues to be weak**. The CDP and MPP control an extensive patronage network including key public administration and political institutions. This provides the parties with access to considerable resources with which to secure electoral success.

- **The re-election of president Kabore in November 2020 was not unexpected** therefore. Of a population of 20 million, 8 million were registered to vote and only 3 million voted. Lower voter turnout suggested that people had little faith in the formal political system.

> *'People don't believe in the leaders and are disillusioned by democracy and believe that solutions to the main problems are not found amongst the political leadership. Instead, people have more faith in traditional leaders and religious leaders, and perhaps some civil society leader. (Key informant interview, November 2020)*

- **The president is able to exert considerable power.** Decision-making authority within the government is largely concentrated within the executive and at the centre. The National Assembly lacks efficiency and oversight mechanisms, while the judiciary is dominated and politicised in practice by the executive.

- **The military can exert considerable power and faith leaders have significant authority**. Military power was shown during the 2015 coup crisis (BTI, 2018) and Muslim associations successfully contested government proposed regulation to reinforce secularism, which included a ban on praying in public spaces (Garda World, 2018)).

Public services

- **Within the executive, decisions on budget and human resources are made centrally**. For instance, by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Civil Service, Labour and Social Security, while other ministries carry them out.

- **Decentralisation was designed to bring social services and administration closer to the people. However, limited financial and technical resources have severely constrained the extent to which any local autonomy could be exercised** (World Bank, 2015).

- **The government has established a legal and regulatory framework to improve public services but this has not translated into actual improvements**. Concentration of financial and human resources at the centre limits the administration's capacity to respond to citizen needs.

- **Weak capacity to deliver essential public services is exacerbated** by the fact that many front-line workers – like teachers and magistrates – work as managers and administrators in key ministries. This is reflected in the country's poor scores across a range of public sector and governance indicators (World Bank, 2015).

The role of international actors

- **Burkina Faso has been highly dependent on international aid flows**, which made up 8.7% of the country's gross national income in 2016 (OECD, 2017). Its most important bilateral donors were the European Union, France, Germany and the United States.

- **International institutions provide some constraints to policymaking**. For instance, monetary policy is set by the Central Bank of West African States, while fiscal policy needs to consider the frameworks set by the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Economic Community of West African States, and governance and corruption is monitored by the Bretton Woods Institutions.

- **Donor pressure and resources have been influential.** For instance, helping to increase public expenditure in education and health. Without this, it is unlikely that the country would have experienced high rates of growth in school enrolment after 1990. However, donors are themselves constrained, limiting the amount of pressure they can exert on the government (Koussoube, 2014).

- **Encouraged by foreign donors, the government passed anti-corruption legislation in 2015.** Despite this, weak institutions, a lack of information and a culture of impunity has meant that officials often engage in corrupt practices (GAN Anti-Corruption Portal, 2016).

Industry

- **Given most of Burkina Faso's population are low-income, the main market for would-be entrepreneurs is in public tenders.** Entrepreneurs linked to the ruling party are most likely to benefit, while small and medium-sized enterprises often have to pay bribes to secure contracts (Akouwerabou and

Bako, 2013).

- **Furthermore, government austerity has resulted in industrial action** – especially among public sector workers, which has intensified as resources have been increasingly diverted to address national insecurity (Garda World, 2018).

- **Burkina Faso is one of the world's top-20 producers of gold.** The country is generally not well endowed with natural resources but does have significant reserves of gold, making up 16% of government revenues in 2015 and 65% of the country's total exports.

- **However, the government has had to reduce tax rates on profits** to attract foreign investors, thereby reducing domestic revenues. This is due to relatively high production costs as a result of the country's landlocked position (Koussoube et al., 2014).

- **Gold mining has expanded considerably since the late 2000s, and almost all mines have been the subject of local conflicts** between local communities on the one hand and state and company security forces on the other.

- Membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has had little impact on practices in the mining sector:

> *'I don't think the EITI has brought about a lot of change to Burkina Faso's mining sector… In my opinion, real change has to come from the people on the ground, not from the international system of regional initiatives. People on the ground want to see some real benefit from the mining sector (for example a percentage share of the mining profits) and they don't see that just by having more transparency in the sector. I don't see these kinds of initiatives having any real impact on the political leaders either.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)*

3.1.3. Civil society and citizen engagement

- **Burkina Faso has considerable civil society traditions, rooted in pre-colonial society**. This comprises mainly *groupement villageois* (village

groups) and other community-based organisations (BTI, 2018).

- **More professional civil society organisations in urban areas formally enjoy a range of freedoms** in the form of, e.g. constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech (BTI, 2018).

- **Some NGOs have mobilised around corruption, establishing the NGO Anti-Corruption National Network**. They have reported pervasive corruption in, for instance, the customs service, tax agencies and the police forces and its effects (GAN Integrity, 2016).

- **The media has enjoyed a better operating environment since mass protests in 2014**. Defamation has been decriminalised, the public broadcaster has experienced less political interference and self-censorship among journalists has eased. However, journalists continue to experience pressure from government officials (Freedom House, 2018).

- **Despite theoretical freedoms, on the whole, civil society's political influence is limited**. CSOs tend to play an advisory role to government, addressing problems and mediating conflict rather than challenging them (key informant interview, November 2020). When NGOs do challenge government figures, they face harassment in carrying out their work (Freedom House, 2020).

- **Most citizens do not see civil society as representative of their needs and aspirations and too close to the political elite:**

  'The traditional CSOs have lost a lot of credit and confidence among people because they are seen as not being too preoccupied with citizen's needs. People feel the same distrust towards CSOs and their leaders as they feel towards politicians. They see the same CSO leaders in charge for decades and being too close to the political elite and the political establishment.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)

- **Citizens have increasingly resorted to direct action and street protests** – a dynamic that the government has partially tolerated (Freedom House, 2020)

- **Less-formal youth organisations have effectively mobilised young people through social media** (key informant interview, November 2020). For instance, citizens – especially young people – rose up unsupported by formal CSOs against Blaise Compaore. But at least 14 unarmed citizens were shot dead during protests against the 2015 coup by the presidential guard, and many protesters were arrested, demonstrating the continued influence of the military and limits of the government's tolerance (BTI, 2018).

3.2. Ghana

3.2.1. Economic, social and governance indicators

- **Ghana's economy has been growing over the past five years:**
  - per capita GDP is up from $1,721 to $2,164
  - overall GDP up from $47.7 billion to $65.3 billion
  - growth rate up from 2.2% to 6.5%
  - inflation rate down from 17.1% to 7.9% ([Focus Economics](#))

- **The Economic Freedom Index 2020 rates the Ghanaian economy as mostly unfree since 2017.** Ghana scores 59.4 on the Index, making its economy the 104th freest in the world. The country ranks 11th among 47 countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region and its overall score is well above the regional average and slightly below the world average.

- **It is crawling back towards the moderately free ranks for the past two years** – seen in the acceleration of GDP growth (although much of this derives from the expanding oil and gas sector).

- **The Index recommends that Ghana stimulate growth in non-oil sectors** by strengthening its fiscal health by not taking on additional debt (including from China) and prioritising further improvements in property rights, judicial effectiveness and government integrity.

- **For the TPA field, there is much work to do** – both in contributing to the expansion of non-oil and gas parts of the economy and in increasing transparency and accountability of the oil and gas industry itself.

- **Overall, Ghana performs well on governance indicators**, which provides an enabling environment for interventions in the TPA field:
  - The Ibrahim Index of African Governance: rates Ghana's on transparency and accountability as 45.2 out of 100 – a downward trend over the past five years.
  - The World Governance Indicators: give Ghana a rating of 65.5 for voice and accountability performance – an improvement of 1.5 points.

o <u>The Global Corruption Barometer:</u> measures citizen agreement with the statement 'Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption' – puts Ghana at 60, with an overall performance improvement of +7 over the five years.

3.2.2. Political context

- **Ghana has come to be known as one of the few African countries to have created a strong democracy,** with generally peaceful elections and sustained economic growth, respect for human rights, free and fair elections.

- **However, successive governments in Ghana are associated with weak state capacity to undertake deep structural transformation** to enable the wide range of interest groups to effectively contribute to governance and democracy.

- **President Akufo-Addo, of the NPP, was re-elected in 2020**, defeating his predecessor John Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). These two political parties have dominated Ghanaian politics.

- **The general elections have always resulted in second-runs or close calls** (with wins of just over 50% of the vote). This has resulted in intensive campaigning that has increasingly polarised society. It has also arguably bled into the spaces *in between* elections and suffocated what could have otherwise been healthy political debates because even civil society has tended to take sides.

- **Akufo-Addo's 2016 & 2020 campaigns centred on economic development**. He promised to build a <u>Ghana beyond aid</u>, which seeks to create a new social contract between the government and citizens. This social contract would bring together all resources (financial, human etc.) and use them to get things done, with impacts that are inclusive and beyond frameworks of international donors and decision-making institutions.

- **In September 2020, Akufo-Addo signed the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act**, which bans all political and other vigilante groups and assigns penalties of up to 15 years in prison for acts of vigilantism. The practical effects of the new law remain to be seen (Freedom House, 2020).

- **Politically connected corruption remains a problem in Ghana**, despite active media coverage, fairly robust laws and institutions, and government anti-graft initiatives. Legislation adopted in 2017 established the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to investigate political corruption.

- **President Akufo-Addo appointed former attorney general Martin Amidu, a member of the opposition NDC, as the special prosecutor**

in 2018. However, Amidu has complained publicly about the lack of government funding for the OSP's operations. Since its creation, the OSP has investigated a number of cases, but it has yet to establish a track record of prosecutions targeting public officials (Freedom House, 2020).

- **In May 2019, Akufo-Addo's signed the Right to Information Act**, which comes after almost two decades of debate, grants citizens the right to seek, access, and receive information from public and some private institutions (Freedom House, 2020).

- **Private discussion is both free and vibrant.** The government does not restrict individual expression on social media. The right to peaceful assembly is constitutionally guaranteed and generally respected. Permits are not required for meetings or demonstrations. The law is intended to foster greater transparency and accountability in public affairs.

- **In December 2018, Ghana launched the National Anti-Corruption Reporting Dashboard**, an online reporting tool to coordinate anti-corruption efforts of various bodies as set out in the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan. A total of 169 governmental and nongovernmental organisations have used the tool to report on their efforts to stem corruption in the country (US State Department, 2019: 14).

- **Ghana is replete with laws and regulations that create an enabling environment for good governance, but there is now a need to now make these work for greater transparency, participation and accountability between and among societies in Ghana.**

3.2.3.   Civil society and citizen engagement

- **NGOs are largely able to operate freely, and play an important role in ensuring government accountability and transparency.** Bertelsmann Stiftung's latest governance analysis of Ghana notes that the country has a relatively well-grounded tradition of civil society, supported by donor assistance and a regulatory framework and political culture that permit freedom of organisations and expression (BTI, 2018).

- **Civil society groups are outspoken and well trained in using the media to voice opinions and engage with government**. Sometimes, however, politicians actively use civil society organisations (CSOs) for their own means (BTI, 2018: 30), and it is not always easy to differentiate between those NGOs that are "independent" and those with strong affiliations to a political party or leading political figure.

- **Relatively steady economic growth has put money into the hands of a small but consistently growing urban middle class – the traditional**

backbone of NGOs. In rural areas, more traditional forms of organisation persist. Religious organisations, especially the ever-rising number of Pentecostal and African Independent Churches, with their accompanying institutions, are playing an increasingly important role, including providing essential social services.

- **Trade unionism, on the other hand, remains relatively weak and is only visible from time to time in organising popular discontent** (BTI, 2020: 12). According to government web sources, around 300,000 NGOs are registered with the Ghanaian Ministry of Manpower, Education and Youth, the state's regulating body, not counting international NGOs (BTI, 2020: 13).

- **Apart from allowing civil society to operate freely, there is a general sense that the Ghanaian government is opening up to civil society participation.** Over the past couple decades, CSOs have evolved from having minimum involvement to becoming active players at various stages of the policymaking cycle.

- **The government encourages civil society actors to participate in agenda-setting and policy formulation up to a certain level** – particularly when it wants to show commitment to transparency or to address certain pressing issues.

- **The government also engages civil society when it is evident that its support is needed to provide necessary services to the population – such as in the healthcare system.** Sometimes, the knowledge of specialised NGOs is used to overcome a lack of expertise in state institutions, especially if they are foreign-funded. In the area of education, the government has also actively encouraged civil society actors to become stakeholders to accelerate the progress of initiated reforms.

- **Generally, the political elite has come to accept the role of an active civil society, even if the relationship is sometimes strained** (BTI, 2020: 33). However, elected politicians and officials in public administration regard criticism or questions by civil society actors as unwarranted and disrespectful.

- **Whether ministries or other government agencies embrace a culture of openness and engagement with civil society or not ultimately depends on the individuals in those institutions.** As noted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung's governance analysis of Ghana, agenda-setting and strategic planning is determined by powerful individuals, and if a strategy fails to attract the support of a responsible minister it will remain little more than paperwork (BTI, 2018: 26). A similar sentiment was expressed by a representative from SEND-Ghana:

> *'In Ghana, the level of government openness is not a problem, it is the quality of the openness that is the problem; that they listen to us and work with us. This often has to do with individuals. Some individuals in ministries are enthusiastic about this and others are not. So, you cannot talk of government as a unified body in that sense.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)*

- **Citizen engagement is better at the subnational (district or community level) in Ghana.** At the national level, some are apathetic, some give up and conclude that all political actors are the same.

- **Citizens in Ghana also engage through their chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs has been instrumental in promoting a peaceful electoral process that has delivered credible elections.** For instance, in 2016 the National House of Chiefs was key in facilitating national cohesion and electoral peace through the signing of another peace pact in Accra (IDEG, 2016). At this forum, presidential candidates pledged to act against all forms of violence that will undermine the credibility and integrity of the elections and its outcomes. This contributed to ensuring collaboration among national political actors to save the nation from the potentially ravaging impact of electoral violence.

3.3. Kenya

3.3.1. Economic, social and governance indicators

- **Kenya's economy has been growing, led by expanding consumer demand**. Per capita GDP increased from $1,433 in 2015 to $1,931 in 2019, and overall GDP from $63.3 billion to $95.3 billion. Public debt, however, has also grown from 50% of GDP to 63% – much of which is domestic debt that ends up crippling private sector growth and then the economy.

- **In the Economic Freedom Index 2020, Kenya ranks 23rd among 47 countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region**, scoring 55.3. This places it near the regional average but well below the world average, 132nd freest country.

- **The Kenyan economy has been rated as mostly unfree for more than two decades**. In recent years, economic freedom has been curtailed by weak rule of law (especially government integrity) and poor freedom of investment and finance.

- **Policymaking and implementation remain vulnerable to risks** such as drought, insecurity, corruption and political contestations between different political leaders.

- **Kenya's economy has been severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic** – especially in terms of incomes and jobs (World Bank, 2020). The World Bank report attributes this to the containment measures that Kenya has adopted in response to the crisis, which have limited domestic business activities, citizen behaviour and trade and travel (affecting key foreign currency earners such as tourism).

- **The pandemic has increased poverty in Kenya** by 4 percentage points (or an additional 2 million poor) due to its serious impact on livelihoods, causing sharp decreases in incomes and doubling unemployment to more than 10%. For the wage workers still in employment, they face reduced working hours and revenues, exacerbating food insecurity and human suffering.

- **Tax revenue also dropped below target**, due to the economic slowdown and tax relief offered by the government, which at the same time increased public expenditure to strengthen the healthcare capacity to manage infections, protect the most vulnerable households and support businesses.

- **The net result is that Kenya is currently struggling on social and economic fronts** (World Bank, 2020). FocusEconomics analysts project GDP growth of 5.0% in 2021 and 5.4% in 2022, but point to growing public debt as a challenge.

- **In terms of key governance indicators**, the Ibrahim Governance Index 2020 rates Kenya 45.4 out of 100 in terms of transparency and accountability – an improving trend. The World Governance Indicators rate Kenya 36.5 for its voice and accountability performance – falling by 6 points over a five-year period. Kenya's Global Corruption Barometer score has also fallen (by 4 points over the past five years), putting it at 54.

The overall picture is one of decreasing governance performance, especially in the run-up to the 2022 general elections.

3.3.2. Political context

- **Kenya's political economy is characterised by a continuous tension** between redistribution politics (the struggle for an inclusive economy and access to key assets like land) and 'recognition' politics (the struggle for identity through ethnicity).

- **The push for group identities comes to the fore in political bargaining, competitive politics and general elections**. But identity-informed bargaining undermines efforts to redistribute socioeconomic resources, and leads to increasing inequality and the emergence of elites who have access to resources because of who they are or identify as, making it difficult for asset redistribution to materialise (Branch, 2011).

- **In the past decade, the biggest shift in governance has been the promulgation of the 2010 constitution.** The constitution is a central part of Kenya's political settlement – the balance of power and agreement between groups about political and economic 'rules' – and of the country's growth and redistribution agenda.

- **The 2010 constitution was followed by a decentralisation process that changed the Kenyan governance system**, devolving power from a highly centralised state to 47 new county-level governments.

- **Articles 174 and 175 of the constitution are key in framing the context for transparency, participation and accountability in Kenya**. They emphasise that devolution should: allow for self-governance by the people of Kenya; promote the democratic and accountable use of state power and public participation in decision-making; promote and protect the rights and interests of minorities and marginalised groups; and advance social and economic development and provision of and access to services throughout Kenya.

- **Putting into practice aspirations set out in the 2010 constitution has been a major challenge.**

- **Newly created county governments have had to develop their own mechanisms to engage different actors** – including the private sector, citizens, civil society, traditional leaders, faith-based organisations and even external agencies. Some counties with more progressive governors, such as Makueni County, champion participatory governance while others lag far behind.

- **Contextual differences within Kenya have meant progress towards meaningful devolution has been patchy** because they require different approaches based on where the county is starting from, and this has had a direct impact on the

character of TPA initiatives.

- **Some counties have achieved successes in better managing their resources. While in others there has been waste, mismanagement and corruption**, as evidenced by reports of the Auditor General and Controller of Budget.

- **Inequalities are stark both between counties and within them.** Therefore, the full potential of devolution is yet to be realised – and if this is not properly addressed, it could have widespread negative repercussions for Kenya's development prospects.

- **The forthcoming 2022 elections are already shaping the political manoeuvres of various parties.** Battles are being fought, for example, over the detail of the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), which followed the March 2018 handshake between H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta and the Rt Hon. Raila Odinga. It was expected to bring about a constitutional review of how to reshape power and how it is contested. Some – especially those supporting the Vice President – see the BBI as a side show and unnecessary in the run up to elections.

- **These political manoeuvres tend to undermine efforts to evolve a meaningful and well-instituted policy and practice based on transparency and accountability**. Should the referendum go ahead and the tabled BBI be passed, state-society contestations will be reshaped around new power bases, in addition to county governments and the executive.

- **It is difficult at the moment to see whether these bills would result in the deepening of democratic gains obtained over the past decade because significant forces are set against the BBI**. The actors against the BBI are questioning the prudence of introducing new structures near general elections, the potential to increase bureaucratic spend. It has ended up dividing youth movements and civil society to a greater extent because of the ethnically linked political polarity.

- **Kenya has enacted progressive legislation**, such as the 2003 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, in addition to the 2016 Bribery Act, and established independent oversight bodies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

- **But from a citizen perspective, these formal establishments appear to be having very little impact.** Evidence suggests that Kenya continues to grapple with high levels of corruption, widespread and entrenched impunity – often associated with strong ties to politicians and essential services such as the police, judiciary and lands services continue to feature highly on the bribery index. As a result, the public mostly see state-led anti-corruption efforts as performative and applied selectively to advance political agendas

3.3.3. Civil society and citizen engagement

- **Kenya has an active NGO sector, with civil society having played a crucial role in building a democratic public sphere**. Including, for example, during Kenya's transition in 1999 to a multiparty democracy, its 2003 and 2004 constitutional conferences and the implementation of its 2010 constitution (BTI, 2020: 29).

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- **However, civil society groups have faced growing obstacles in recent years.** This includes repeated government attempts to deregister hundreds of NGOs for alleged financial violations.

- **The Kenyatta government took a critical stance towards NGOs**, **refusing to begin implementation of the Public Benefits Organizations Act**. The Act was passed in 2013 to improve the regulatory framework for NGOs and offer greater freedom for them to operate (Freedom House, 2020). Instead, old legislation from the autocratic Moi era is still in force and, from time to time, used to interfere with and sabotage NGOs (BTI, 2020: 9).

- **In 2016, Kenya passed the Access to Information Act**. It drew on the 2010 constitution, which provides that 'Every citizen has the right of access to: (a) information held by the State; and (b) information held by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental freedom' and encourages the Kenya government to 'publish or publicise any important information affecting the nation'.

- **A number of legal provisions require that civil servants and public institutions provide or publicise accurate information in a timely fashion**. Including: the Public Service (Values and Principles) Act (No. 1A of 2015) and the Public Finance Management Act (2012).

- **However, growing concerns around access to information undermine gains achieved in terms of the constitutional and legal positions**. This includes enhanced state surveillance and monitoring, including on social media; threats to the freedom of expression and opinion via the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (2018); and a shrinking civic space, especially during the electoral period.

- **Devolution has increased spaces for citizens to engage.** But different projects, like the Deepening Democracy Programme, attest to the fact that there are huge variations in the extent to which meaningful citizen engagement is possible.

- **Most citizens engage with their county governments through their Members of County Assembly (MCA).** But MCAs tend to be weak in terms of their ability to interrogate reports produced by the county government (TIK, 2020).

- **56% of citizens do not have access to information about their county government performance on various issues**. Those that do mostly access it through radio and TV (Transparency International Kenya, 2020). Only 31% of county governments proactively share information on their performance, despite all of them having dedicated access to information officers (ibid). The Integrated County Government Plans are among those documents that are shared.

- **There is clearly a lot of work to do in terms of expanding citizens' access to actionable information**. As one interviewee indicated:

> *'On the other hand, nobody would facilitate you. In fact, the government would frustrate you by denying you information or providing it late and those kinds of tactics. This can be exemplified by how the budget process works with regard to the county integrated development plans. These are participatory platforms enacted in law and citizens are supposed to participate but what happens is that you won't get the budget documents, and if you do get them, they won't be in the appropriate format. This is how these participatory mechanisms are frustrated and how they become tick-in-the-box exercises.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)*

- **A few county governments, such as Makueni County, have gone further than simply making budgeting and planning documents available**. Instead, the county executive engages the public during the preparation and approval of the annual budget through various forums (*barazas* – or meetings – and radio), through their public participation framework. These are, however, exceptions to the usually informal practices of county officials (KIPRA, 2019).

- **Most participation tends to be consultative rather than dialogical and empowering**. And the creation of spaces or invitations to participate are often provided too short a notice to ensure meaningful engagement.

3.4. Senegal

3.4.1. Economic, social and governance indicators

- **The Economic Freedom Index rates Senegal as generally free**, with an expanding economy over the past five years. Its score is 58.0 – 110th in the world and 13th among 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, putting it above regional average.

- **However, economic freedom is held back by a defective judicial system, low government integrity and a lack of business freedom** (apart from some few leading sectors, such as tourism and transport).

- **Kenya's GDP growth outlook overall is favourable and projected to remain solid** at 6.8% in 2020, reflecting higher investment and exports. Growth rates could exceed 7% from 2021 onwards if fiscal vulnerabilities are contained and transformational reforms are implemented to crowd-in private sector investments (World Bank Press Release, 2020).

- **In terms of key governance indicators**: the Ibrahim Index of African Governance gives Senegal's performance on Transparency and Accountability a rating of 57.2 out of 100 – a trend of "slowing improvement" over the past five years. The World Governance Indicators rate Senegal 55.7 in voice and accountability, down by 2 points. According to the Global Corruption Barometer, however, 52% of citizens agree that "Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption" in Senegal – a 4-point improvement over the past five years.

- **This suggests a general positive trajectory in the transparency, participation and accountability (TPA) field, albeit at a slower rate of progress than expected.**

3.4.2. Political context

- **In February 2019, President Macky Sall won a second consecutive term** with 58% of the vote in the first round, avoiding a runoff. Two leading opposition leaders were barred from running because of previous, politically fraught convictions for embezzlement of public funds (Freedom House, 2020).

- **In May 2019, lawmakers approved a controversial measure to abolish the post of prime minister**, which the President signed. This prompted outcry from critics, who accused him of seeking to consolidate power and undercut checks and balances (Freedom House, 2020).

- **Corruption remains a serious problem in Senegal,** and high-level officials often act with impunity. Anti-corruption bodies enforce the law

unevenly and are sometimes viewed as politically motivated (Freedom House, 2020).

- **In 2014, and again in 2018, violent clashes between students and the police** demonstrated the potential for conflict over the serious crisis in the education system. Frequent clashes continue to take place over monetary issues and housing problems, and are occasionally politicised. The situation is exacerbated by high youth unemployment in the country and a sense of marginalisation among some groups (BTI, 2020: 32).

- **The 2012 election and the 2016 referendum have strengthened the role of civil society organisations** (CSOs), although the participation of civil society in the governance of the country is still somewhat limited.

- **Broadly speaking, President Macky Sall has a more inclusive governance style than his predecessor and maintains strong political and personal relations with civil society leaders and media representatives.** He is generally supportive of CSO activities and integrates CSOs and their leaders into policymaking processes.

- **In May 2016, Sall held a "national dialogue" with the opposition, civil society and religious organisations**. The event was more a series of presentations than a conversation – although it did pave the way for the release and subsequent exile of Karim Wade.

- **There has not, however, been any meaningful follow-up (BTI, 2020: 36).** This suggests that even though spaces for dialogue exist in Senegal, their real end is usually not known, implying perhaps that it is merely window dressing.

- **According to interviewees, democracy in Senegal is entrenched in the laws, regulations and practice.** There many legal frameworks – including in the constitution and other regulations – that stipulate the need to facilitate citizen participation.

- **Institutions have been put in place to make it easy for citizens to contribute to policymaking, monitoring and accountability.** There are also provisions for participation at the sectoral level – for example, in land governance the development of one particular policy took three years because of a wide range of consultations that were involved. In the health sector, to deliver universal health coverage, the government has put in place a ministerial committee that includes CSOs and meets regularly.

'If you look back, we have moved from confrontation and protest to becoming more and more a force of proposition, which the government can now easily take into account in their decision making, e.g. the universal health care law has drawn largely on CSO contributions and research. The political space is wide enough for TPA engagement in this 'force for proposition', and the government can take a lot of ideas from the private sector, CSOs and other actors.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)

- **There is a multiplicity of free media – radio, TV and broadcast press** – as one interviewee indicated:

'If you listen to the radio in Senegal you wonder, how can the government accept that. They have also adopted the Access to Information Act – which took a long time – in advocacy for more than 25- 26 years and we are almost there now There are also hearings at the national assembly where they ask CSOs to express themselves on what they are working on.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)

3.4.3.   Civil society and citizen engagement

- **Civic engagement in Senegal has two distinct facets: (1) engagement in the political arena and (2) engagement around service provision,** interviewees told us. In the political arena there's a general perception that CSOs adopt political discourse and positions to engage with the government and that this is problematic. In the service provision arena, it's perceived that engagement tends to achieve more than in the political space because CSOs work on thematic issues that resonate with people's lives and livelihoods.

- **Opposition parties, civil society and interest groups have criticised the deteriorating state of democratic institutions.** It remains to be seen whether the recent constitutional reforms in the 2016 referendum, some of which have not yet been implemented, will improve the situation (BTI, 2020: 14). At the end of 2018, the opposition movement Front de Résistance Nationale (FRN), which consists largely of young people, organised rallies to protest

parrainage – the lack of transparency in the electoral process and the exclusion of Karim Wade and Khalifa Sall (BTI, 2020: 15).

- **Senegalese trade unions are active, but their impact remains relatively insignificant as they represent only a fraction of the working population**. Senegal's formal economy, where unions are traditionally strong, is small and shrinking – employing just 500,000 people in the public and private sectors combined. Senegalese unions have only just started to be active in the much larger informal economy, which accounts for 95% of the economy.

- **The informal economy is largely self-organised.** Some informal organisations have either national representation and/or presence in Dakar. Others are transitioning from ad-hoc groups to formal organisations in Dakar´s outlying communities. Some of these organisations have decided to join large central trade unions like the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal, and the Confédération des Syndicats Autonomes (Abizaid, 2019).

- **In 2018, Senegal's Ministry of the Interior recognised the Confederation of Informal Economy Organisations as the official trade union federation for the informally employed**. This meant that workers would access benefits such as the Universal Health Coverage.

- **A recent decision to introduce a 10% threshold for elections to nominate federations for the tripartite social dialogue may lead to consolidation and greater organisational unity between unions, which would increase their influence** (BTI, 2002: 16).

- **Associational life is rich in Senegal by sub-Saharan Africa standards, with numerous, highly active NGOs operating in the country.**

- **However, many community groups and NGOs suffer from a lack of resources.** NGOs often rely excessively on international donor funding. In doing so, they may lack credibility in the eyes of the government and among some citizens.

- **A mix of co-opted and critical CSOs.** Some organisations, that played a vital role in President Wade's 2012 election defeat and in the subsequent peaceful transition of power, have been co-opted into the government of President Sall. Others have resumed their more critical outsider roles.

- **In the run-up to the 2019 presidential elections, the government placed a number of restrictions on civil society, including deregistration.** But it was unclear whether this was just nervousness about the election, or whether it marked a worrisome permanent shift (BTI, 2020: 31).

- **The media and CSOs play an active role in stimulating and facilitating public debate. And Senegal's population is engaging openly with the government.**

- **However, rights activists have expressed concern about the National Assembly's passing of a bill on electronic communications in November 2018.** The bill included a vaguely worded provision that expanded the regulatory power of the government over social media companies, could be used to shut down, tax or surveil communications on popular social media platforms (Freedom House, 2020).

- **The rights of private enterprise are generally well protected**. Senegal ranks highly among other African countries in terms of transparency and accountability of government decisions. However, corruption and arbitrary government action remain a problem (BTI, 2020: 24).

- **Religious leaders in the form of the Sufi brotherhoods and their respective Imams exert significant informal political power/influence.**

3.5. Tanzania

3.5.1. Economic, social and governance indicators

- **Tanzania is relatively stable politically and socially** compared with some of its neighbours.

- **It has one of Africa's fastest growing economies**, growing on average 7% annually since 2000. In 2020, the World Bank upgraded the Tanzanian economy from a low-income to a lower-middle-income country, with an estimated per capita gross national income of $1,080 in 2019. However, economic transformation has been elusive.

- **Poverty decreased by 8% over ten years** according to the 2019 Tanzania Mainland Poverty Assessment, down from 34% in 2007 to 26% in 2018. Most of this reduction in poverty was seen in rural areas (where most poverty is concentrated), followed by urban areas outside Dar es Salaam (World Bank).

- **Tanzania is in the low human development category**, scoring 0.538 on the Human Development Index in 2017, putting 154th out of 189 countries and territories. This was a 45% increase from its score in 1990 (UNDP, 2018). Tanzanian society is also increasingly becoming equal in both education and wealth (Maliti, 2019).

- **Reductions in poverty and improvement in human development outcomes have come about due to a sustained increase in access to basic services**, suggests the World Bank. Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer verify this. They suggest that, since 2014, service delivery appears to have improved in sectors prioritised by the public – health, water, education and electricity – with fewer Tanzanians reporting difficulties, delays and demands for bribes. However, poorer citizens were more likely to report difficulties and delays than their wealthier counterparts (Msafiri, 2018).

- **Governance indicators scores have fallen somewhat in recent years.** On transparency and accountability, Tanzania scores 42 out of 100. On the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, an improvement over the past five years. On voice and accountability, the country scores 32 out of 100 on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019 – a reduction of 7 points over the past five years. And in the Global Corruption Barometer 2019, 50% of citizens agreed that "Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption" – a reduction of 5 percentage points in the past five years.

3.5.2. Political context

Historical and political factors

Note: President Magufuli passed away on 17 March 2021, after this report was written. He was replaced by his deputy Samia Suluhu Hassan.

- **In 1992 multiparty politics was introduced. But the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has continued to dominate since Tanzania's independence in 1961**. A strong base of the ruling party was in part to achieve national stability, helped by co-opting security forces and preventing organised opposition from emerging.

- **In the 2015 election, Party for Democracy and Progress ('Chadema') emerged as a formidable opposition, winning 40% of the vote**. But they were defeated by John Pombe Magufuli, who set about centralising power.

- **In the run up to the 2020 elections, Magufuli systematically repressed the opposition and the media.** He subsequently won the presidential election by a large margin, amid opposition allegations of fraud (Andreoni, 2017; Eriksen, 2018; Freedom House, 2020). #

- **Horizontal accountability mechanisms are weak.** While the National Assembly is more than a rubber-stamping institution, it has weak deliberation and oversight as the dominant political party holds the most seats.

- **Tanzania's judiciary is both formally and politically weak.** There is security of tenure, but high court judges are appointed by the president. The quality of the justice sector is compromised by lack of resources, poor wages, inefficiency and limited access to lower courts for most citizens (Gloppen 2003).

- **Historically, the public service has been used to reward members of the ruling coalition** through appointments and ensuring election success. (initially politicians, the army, party administrators, civil servants and parastatal organisations and later private entrepreneurs)

- **This has weakened political accountability** by creating an overlap between the party and state structures, from national to district and village levels (Harris et al., 2011). Appointments at district, regional and ministerial level have increasingly come from outside the public service and lack administrative experience and political savvy, reducing administrative efficiency (Eriksen, 2018).

- **In 2015, President Magufuli made fighting corruption a key theme of his administration.** This was in order to find resources to fund an ambitious industrialisation agenda and address shortages in party financing. The government removed 16,000 ghost workers from its payroll in 2016. 10,000 public employees were removed for not being able to present their educational qualifications. Magufuli also fired several key civil servants, thereby dismantling the existing clientelist network and replacing it with a new one.

- **The president has enjoyed huge popularity among the public for taking these actions** (helped also by increasing the government budget allocation for free education).

- **However, it has also created a culture of fear and uncertainty within the civil service** and political establishment, which may hinder reform of public services (UNICEF, 2017).

- **Despite some results, Magufuli's vertical approach to anti-corruption has limitations**. It has not had any impact on lower levels of the ruling coalition's pyramidal structure. Centres of corruption have retained their power and resisted change (Andreoni, 2017).

- **The security services, who have been implicated in corruption cases, are shielded from prosecution.** Meanwhile, key investment vehicles like public pension and social security funds are often diverted to politicians and speculative property projects, making root and branch reform unlikely (Eriksen, 2018).

- **Decentralisation-by-devolution was initiated in 1972 and strengthened significantly in the 1990s.** While policy guidance and resource allocation remain strongly centralised, local governments control significant budgets.

- **However, decentralisation has not improved transparency, answerability or law enforcement.** Instead, market reforms such as land reform have made local government important for businesses of all sizes and a valuable source of rents for officials, local politicians and the business community.

- **The distinction between central and local government is blurred by the presidentially appointed District Commissioners, who wield substantial – if often informal – power** (Harris et al., 2011).

Industry

- **Tanzania has East Africa's most developed extractive industries sector.** Petroleum production and gold mining are critical to the government's industrialisation ambitions and have the potential to boost national revenues and provide considerable rents to both the state and political and bureaucratic elites.

- **These industries have been the site of repeated legislative reform and target setting.** For example, the power system master plan, which envisaged the share of coal in electricity generation moving from 0% to 35% and natural gas capacity to increase by more than 490% in the next 40 years.

- **However, the extractives industry faces various challenges.** Mistrust has dominated the relationship between the public and private sector (Andreoni, 2017). During the country's early history, the state intentionally hindered the development of private business in adopting characteristics of a development state and then adopted Ujamaa, a socialist ideology that seeks to strengthen the state and forge a national identity (Therkildsen & Bourgoin, 2012).

- **Despite economic reforms in the 1980s and the emergence of business interests and their incorporation into the ruling coalition, mutual suspicion persists** (Eriksen, 2018).

- **Nevertheless, Magufuli signalled to the private sector that he is willing to engage in deal-making** involving the allocation of rents for productive investments in industrial sectors but that he is willing to discipline those rents (Andreoni, 2017).

- **The technical integrity of bureaucracy in the mining sector was considered weak,** with senior bureaucrats carrying out politician's rent-seeking orders or being side lined over major policy, procurement and regulatory issues (Kelsall & Cooksey, 2011; Eriksen, 2018).

- **The petroleum sector's development was hindered by a combination of questionable rent management and poorly coordinated policy and decision-making processes**, which have prevented the sector from benefiting from positive market conditions.

- **Crucially, Eriksen (2018) suggests that the Ministry of Energy and Minerals is uninterested in joint planning or coordination with other ministries**, which has enabled it to identify, isolate and capture potential rents. The mining sector is also grappling with its role in human rights violations, land grabs and environmental damage (BTI, 2020).

- **The current administration's budget targets (based on the government's industrialisation agenda) are ambitious and have required new sources of financing**. Pederson and Kweka (2017) suggest that investments from the Global South (namely China, India and Mauritius) can more readily accommodate the ambiguities in the legal frameworks that govern investments such as land acquisition in Tanzania. Eriksen (2018) states that an increase in such investments may serve to underpin state–business relations that are not conducive to inclusive growth.

International engagement

- **Aid flows to Tanzania have been in decline for years**. Aid as a percentage of the government budget reduced from 44% in 2004/5 to 7% in 2015/16.

- **Donor engagement has tended to be technical support in areas of strategic importance to the government.** Examples include Norwegian support to the petroleum sector, Japanese support to the natural gas sector and UK support to education (Eriksen, 2018).

- **Tanzania's commitment to international norms of governance and accountability has tailed off**. This together with the decline in aid has left less room for donors to seek improvements in accountability and corruption (ibid).

- Tanzania joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2009 and the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011 – perhaps due to perceived improvements in international reputation (David-Barrett and Okamura, 2015). However, Eriksen (2018) suggests that Former President Kikwete's personal commitment to these were not matched by transformational

achievements, with Tanzania withdrawing from the OGP under Magufuli's presidency in 2017.

- **Tanzania's attitude towards the East African Community of which it is a member, is a cautious one**. **The government prefers to deal with its interests through bilateral relationships**, as illustrated by its 2016 agreement with Uganda on routing Uganda's pipeline for crude oil export through Tanzania (Africa Confidential, 2016).

- **Tanzania is regarded as being at risk from violent extremism** that emanates from the regional epicentre of Somalia. It is less affected than countries like Kenya, though recent years have seen several terrorist incidents believed to be undertaken by groups either sympathetic to or directly affiliated with al-Shabaab.

3.5.3. Civil society and citizen engagement

- **Space for expressing dissenting views has become even more restrained over the last decade**, whether these come from the opposition, the media or civil society (Freedom House, 2020; BTI, 2020).

- **Civil society now generally fears overstepping boundaries.** CSOs and activists are faced with a choice between pursuing important but potentially controversial issues, such as extractives, or taking a more technocratic approach in support of public services.

- **Protests and demonstrations such as those against the Mtwara-Dar es Salaam pipeline in 2013 have been met by severe state reactions**. In 2019, six NGOs were deregistered for "operating contrary to its objectives" (Freedom House, 2020). Eriksen (2018) suggests that the Tanzanian NGO sector tends to engage in low-level advocacy work dominated by activists close to the regime who choose to work on non-controversial topics.

- **Improving the business environment appears to be one of these non-controversial topics**. For instance, through the donor-funded BEST-Dialogue programme, sectoral and national representative bodies have received support to lobbying for an improved business environment – helping to advance the government's own economic interests.

- **This is in a context where modern professional CSOs are a relatively new phenomenon.** Between 1993 and 2000 Tanzania experienced a 38-fold increase in the number of registered NGOs (from 224 to 8,499). Most of these were engaged in service delivery, but some NGOs sought to engage politically – influenced somewhat by the international community on which many were reliant for funding.

- **CSOs were initially concentrated in major cities. But a combination of decentralisation and the availability of donor funding has led to the growth of CSOs at the district level** (Eriksen, 2018; Harrison, 2018).

- **The obligatory consultations with civil society and communities in drawing up Tanzania's first Poverty Reduction Support Paper normalised the involvement of civil society in policy development.** Changes such as reform to oversight institutions between 2005 and 2010 further opened up spaces for civil society.

- **However, the impact of these changes has been limited**. Reforms have been reversed in response to the exposure of grand corruption, which underpinned the political settlement. This weakened the CCM – shown in the 2015 election where Magufuli's share of the vote fell to 58%, the lowest ever for the ruling party.

- **For many organisations shrinking civic space is something of a background issue alongside other priorities and longer-term challenges** (Harrison 2018). This is particularly true at the subnational level, where there is more routine interaction between CSOs and government and where this is more focused on service delivery than advocacy.

- **Certain forms of advocacy work appear to be less sensitive.** For instance, paralegal organisations do not seem to be adversely affected. And some organisations have found ways to frame advocacy in less adversarial terms, wherein CSOs mediate dialogue rather than communicating messages themselves. For instance, civil society informant indicated:

> *'It is possible to achieve a lot as a CSO in Tanzania as long as you are using a lot of evidence to challenge the status quo. In this case, your actions are perceived by the government as apolitical and the government can then consult you effectively. If you raise your head to then comment on issues that are associated with political party positioning, you are silenced…so donors must support evidence-generation by CSOs so that they can, through evidence, get a seat on the table with the government. This is how CSOs are seen as complementing government efforts.' (Key informant interview, November 2020)*

- **The relationship between CSOs and government in Tanzania is influenced by who has the funds, capacity and legitimacy to implement a project** including those aimed at improving services. And given that it is rare either side has a monopoly on these resources, CSOs and government need each other (Harrison, 2018).

4. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND REFERENCES

4.1. Global trends: Methodology and data

Articles on global trends in the TPA field have been adapted from an unpublished report, written as part of a scan of the TPA landscape undertaken by OTT Consulting to inform the Hewlett Foundation's new five-year grantmaking strategy 2020-2025. This rapid evidence assessment of global trends intended to address two questions from the landscape scan:

1. What is known about the role of transparency and participation for improving accountability/good governance in relation to selected TPA subfields?
2. What gaps are there in the evidence base?

The TPA subfields selected by the Hewlett Foundation are: budget and expenditure transparency; natural resource governance; procurement reform; responsible investing and corporate behaviour; social accountability; and tax.

To address these questions, a search strategy was developed to find relevant and recently published literature per priority subfield. This strategy started by identifying a number of relevant databases, both belonging to organisations working within each subfield and other, wider databases and subsequently conducting the searches using relevant and suitable search terms.

Having conducted the searches, the goal was to find and summarise three publications for each subfield and to choose the research that most aptly addressed the research question. When possible, we used systematic reviews or other types of meta-analysis to avoid biasing the findings caused by the limited number of reports per subfield. The search resulted in a total of 99 reports from which 18 were selected. The full literature list is available here. The section below contains the summary of the rapid evidence assessment per priority theme (in alphabetical order).

Databases consulted

- Open Government Partnership (Health division, General Resources, Extractives division)
- Tax Justice Network
- International Centre for Tax and Development
- Center for Global Development
- The B-Team
- Open Contracting Partnership
- Natural Resource Governance Institute
- Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

- Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency
- International Budget Partnership
- Transparency and Accountability Initiative
- World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
- Chr. Michelsen Institute
- Overseas Development Institute
- African Bank for Development
- Financial Transparency Coalition
- Research for Development Outputs
- Global Partnership for Social Accountability
- Accountability Research Centre
- Action for Accountability and Empowerment
- Institute of Development Studies
- GSDRC (applied knowledge services)
- Eldis
- 3ie database (of impact evaluations and systematic reviews)
- DEReC (DAC Evaluation Resource Centre)
- Google Scholar
- GovNet

Global thought leaders interviewed

A carefully selected number of interviewees were asked to share insights on their specific themes, with particular emphasis on Africa. Interviews were semi-structured around a set of broad questions with plenty of room set aside for prompting and exploring ideas that were articulated. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and the resulting data has been used to develop and substantiate the ideas expressed in this report.

Social accountability for health: Mr Jeff Thindwa

Jeff Thindwa is the Program Manager for the Global Partnership for Social Accountability in the World Bank's Governance Global Practice (GGP). He joined the World Bank in 2000 and held several positions in Social Development before joining the World Bank Institute in 2010 to lead the social accountability team, later becoming Practice Manager. Prior to joining the World Bank Jeff worked in government, private sector and civil society.

Procurement reform (open contracting): Ms Nkemdilim Ilo

Nkemdilim Ilo is the Chief Executive Officer of Nigeria-based Public and Private Development Centre (PPDC), an organisation that has pioneered procurement and

contract monitoring activities in Nigeria, for example by successfully advocating for the adoption and full implementation of the Open Contracting Data Standards.

Tax (domestic revenue mobilisation): Mr Alvin Mosioma

Alvin Mosioma is the founding Executive Director of Tax Justice Network Africa, a Pan-African Advocacy and Research Network of 32 members in 16 African countries working on Tax Justice and curbing of IFFs from Africa. He is a leading voice on tax policy in Africa and has spearheaded numerous civil society campaigns in Africa since 2007.

Responsible investing and corporate behaviour: Mr Ewan Livingston-Docwra

Ewan Livingston-Docwra is a Cause Strategist at The B Team, leading the organisation's work on responsible tax, including the Responsible Tax Principles, within its Governance & Transparency initiative. Previously he was Head of Corporate Partnerships at ActionAid.

Natural Resource Governance: Ms Evelyne Tsague

Originally from Cameroon, Evelyne Tsague is responsible for the development and support of the Natural Resource Governance Institute's (NRGI) West Africa regional activities. Her work at the NRGI includes identifying research, capacity building and technical assistance needs at the local, national and regional levels.

Budget & Expenditure Transparency/Monitoring: Dr Abraham Rugo Muriu
Abraham Rugo Muriu is the International Budget Partnership's Country Manager for Kenya and is based in Nairobi. Prior to joining IBP in 2017 he worked at the Institute of Economic Affairs, and as a public sector consultant.

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4.2. Funding trends: Methodology and data

Articles on funding trends are authored by Jenny Lah. They have been selected and adapted from an unpublished report, written as part of a scan of the TPA landscape undertaken by OTT Consulting to inform the Hewlett Foundation's new TPA grantmaking strategy for 2020-2025.

This analysis draws on data, funders' documents, other news and reports and a series of semi-structured discussions with 16 funders and experts. The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a key source for scale and trends in funding. Other data sources checked include SDG Funders, Advancing Human Rights of the Human Rights Funders Network (HRFN) and Candid, Aid Atlas and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) reports via d-portal.

In terms of documentation, funders' websites were reviewed, and Google searches were undertaken to uncover news, announcements and other reports. The key sites reviewed were: Devex, Donor Tracker, OECD DAC and the Transparency and Accountability Initiative (TAI).

Due to limited time and data, some kinds of funding are left out, including domestic government funding, community-based funding, the for-profit private sector and Chinese state-sponsored finance. For many TPA issues, the key funding source is domestic governments. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the data because decreases in international funding may actually mean the government increased its own funding.

Interviews were conducted with individuals affiliated with:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark (Bilateral donor)
- Ford Foundation (Philanthropy)
- Gates Foundation (Philanthropy)
- HRFN (Network)
- IDRC (West Africa) (Bilateral donor)
- Luminate (Philanthropy)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finland (Bilateral donor)
- OECD GovNet (Network)
- OSF (Philanthropy)
- OSIWA (Philanthropy)
- Sida (Bilateral donor)
- TAI (Network)
- UK FCDO (Bilateral donor)
- USAID (Bilateral donor)
- Wellspring (Philanthropy)
- World Bank (Multilateral)

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4.3.   Country snapshots: Methodology and data

Country TPA snapshots have been adapted from an unpublished report, written as part of a scan of the TPA landscape undertaken by OTT Consulting to inform the Hewlett Foundation's new grantmaking strategy. The report focused on trends that have implications for TPA in a selected number of countries where the Hewlett Foundation is active: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania.

This rapid evidence assessment of country trends intended to address two questions from the landscape scan:

1. What are the factors shaping governance outcomes in the focus countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania) including principle causes for poor governance and accountability gaps, as well as factors contributing to good governance?
2. What major challenges have emerged or worsened? Particularly, how prevalent an issue is the closing of civic space in the focus countries?

To answer these questions, where possible and appropriate we collected information in two broad areas: (1) Trends in income growth, poverty, inequality, human development, service delivery performance and governance (in areas such as government openness, political accountability, and state effectiveness). (2) Trends in factors that shape the governance and service delivery context. These include:

- Context: this might feature a country's geography, demographic profile, mass attitudes and behaviour and technological changes
- The interests and agendas of competing domestic, regional and international actors, the relationships of power between them and the way they have shifted over time/history
- Institutions – the rules, norms, practices and relationships that influence individual and collective behaviour in the field of governance and service delivery. These can be formal and widely understood in the form of laws and regulation or informal and only understood by certain groups of people.
- Policy networks – the relationships between actors responsible for policy decisions and those such as interest groups or levels of government with which they consult and negotiate.
- Ideas about governance and service delivery and how they are shared within key stakeholder groups.
- Events (or critical junctures), which may be routine and anticipated, such as elections, or unanticipated incidents such as social or natural crises.

Methods and data sources

We reviewed documentation and interviewed a governance expert for each of the five countries. Documentation included:

- Country- and sector-level political economy analyses.

- Country level reports from Bertelsmann Stiftung, the US State Department, Freedom House, Civicus and Afrobarometer.

Limitations

We had hoped to say more about the impact of Covid-19. However, most of our data is from written sources published before the onset of the covid-19 pandemic, resulting in a lack of data about this.

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